With no base of his own and no seat in parliament, Kadhemi could be a convenient choice "because to a certain degree you will get rid of a part of the responsibility when the face of the government is someone else," Higel said.
The loss of seats by Fatah, which is very close to Iran, will not necessarily weaken Tehran's role in Iraq. According to Hasan, Iran has three main interests in its neighbour: ending the US military presence which numbers 2,, and making sure there are no threats coming from Iraq; supporting Hashed; and keeping the Iraqi market open to products from Iran's crippled economy.
Hasan added that Iran "don't see Sadr as an enemy, but they are attentive to the risk of having him dominating" the Shiite scene. The content you requested does not exist or is not available anymore. ON TV. What are the main issues surrounding the current Iraqi government? Political pressure groups are causing great inner political turmoil, with Sunni and Shia militias as well as various tribal parties.
Political Parties of Iraq. Federal Government The federal government of Iraq is defined under the current Constitution as an Islamic, democratic, federal parliamentary republic. Frequently Asked Questions about Iraqi Government 1. What is the Iraqi Government defined as? How many branches of Iraqi government are there?
What are they? Given the huge number of parties and entities registered with the Electoral Commission, which now total about competing for seats in 83 electoral districts, the emergence of a large bloc capable of forming a coherent and effective government is a fantasy. Moreover, the election law is not the only factor that determines the outcomes of the electoral process leading to the formation of a government. The current political system is intentionally designed to impede the creation of an effective government capable of carrying out reforms.
It is governed by a party system that has resulted in a monopoly over political decisions by a small group of leaders, most of whom were not elected in a democratic or transparent process. Nonetheless, the government is usually formed according to formal rules and procedures that appear, at least on the surface, to be democratic. One of the great paradoxes in Iraq is that its party system cannot be described as democratic, and therefore, it is natural that the system is unable to produce true popular representation.
The main parties in Iraq have been led by the same people for the past two decades. Although many of them have witnessed divides and the rise of new splinter parties, the majority of these new parties are not democratic either. Internal party elections, if they take place at all, are a mere formality rather than a means of ensuring the transfer of power to new party cadres, most of which were established to represent the interests of a family or limited leadership, even if they took on national, religious, sectarian, or regional trappings.
The lack of transparency within the parties and their inability to allow for real, meaningful change in leadership is another source of discontent and frustration among many societal groups, especially the youth, who represent about two-thirds of the population.
Reforming the party system in Iraq is a necessary precursor to reforming the electoral process so that it can produce a functioning and effective government and a stable parliament. Therefore, reforming the political parties law will be as important as reforming the electoral law. The presence of many parties does not necessarily indicate a mature political process, but rather reflects a state of confusion and political disorientation.
Although the Iraqi constitution and the literature of most Iraqi political parties emphasize the concept of citizenship and patriotism, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of them lack comprehensive national representation, and they are often based around regional, religious, or sectarian identities. No party or political bloc has managed to win seats in all of Iraq's governorates in any election to date. Therefore, many researchers, politicians, and activists are discussing proposals to reform both the electoral law and the party system so that it enables the formation of large parties that represent the Iraqi electorate across all governorates.
If Iraq had a small number of larger, cross-sectarian parties competing nationally in parliamentary elections, this could facilitate the formation of more effective, stronger, and more harmonious governments.
It would also ensure a relatively large opposition that can monitor government performance without fear of the government intruding or bypassing the political minority. Moreover, delaying the implementation of Article 65 of the constitution , which required the establishment of a second and higher chamber within the legislature to represent the governorates and regions — known as the Federation Council — hindered another opportunity to usher in a more measured, sober political process.
In the absence of this important body, political forces have been compelled to fill the vacuum by seeking the help of unelected political and religious figures or parties from outside Iraq. Efforts to achieve such comprehensive reforms will likely face political obstacles and legal restrictions, and may even require constitutional amendments in some areas.
However, the dangers of neglecting or delaying the political changes required to allow for comprehensive political, economic, and structural reform will be severe. Yet, decision makers still have a chance to take a different path, starting with a comprehensive review and objective assessment of the reasons why the new system has failed to achieve the desired goals.
Time is running out, however; decision makers will soon lose the few remaining options to avoid the potentially horrific collapse of the political process. According to some who have long been involved, the political process has become worn out and lacks the ability for renewal and change needed to produce alternatives to address current and future challenges.
Toppling the statue of the former Iraqi dictator seemed easy at first. But raising its feet from the base proved far more complicated, and in the end it required the intervention of military vehicles and the use of ropes — and only came after a great effort. Will the revitalization of the political process also require complicated and dangerous surgery?
Or will mistakes be corrected and reviewed before it is too late? Naufel Alhassan is an Iraqi politician and former official. The Islamic State — never completely defeated — took advantage of these crises and increased its attacks in disputed territories. What does the delay in forming a government amid multiple crises mean for the post Iraqi political system? These elite stakeholders have together weathered civil war, insurgency and multiple protests — despite deep conflicts with one another.
For instance, in September protesters attacked most major political party headquarters and the Iranian consulate in Basra, and authorities killed some 20 protesters. Since the May election of that year, the fragmented Shia elite had been unable to even declare which side has the largest parliamentary bloc, let alone decide on a government. The system is less able to swiftly fix itself, based primarily on the fragmentation of the elite — and their determination to prevent any challenge to their rule.
The two previous prime minister-designates each fell short for different reasons. He hoped that simply choosing technocratic ministers outside the elite pact, with the support of Moqtada al-Sadr behind him, would garner support from protesters and the disillusioned public.
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