Indeed, Peter Shore has declared in the Commons that the report contains 'more description of the particular problem of the minutiae of policy-making and the administration of policy once it has been made than I have seen anywhere in my political life' HC , Much of this material bears on that fundamental constitutional concept, ministerial accountability. Giles Radice, Chairman of the House of Commons Public Service Committee, which examined the Scott report for its own report on 'Ministerial Accountability and Responsibility', told Scott, 'In your terms of reference, you were not in fact asked Scott summed up his conclusions on ministerial accountability at the very end of his report, K8.
He further elaborated on his conclusions in oral evidence to the Commons Public Service Committee inquiry on 8 May , and in his May Blackstone Lecture on 'Ministerial Accountability'. Scott, however, contests this view. For he believes that the essence of ministerial accountability lies not in the threat of resignation but in the obligation to inform Parliament.
Before beginning his inquiry, Scott declared in his Blackstone Lecture, he 'would have associated ministerial accountability with a need for a minister to resign if serious errors had been committed in the department.
This would, I suspect, be the understanding held by most people of the doctrine of ministerial accountability. But concentration on that existing aspect of ministerial accountability has, to my mind, distracted attention from more important although less dramatic aspects of this constitutional principle'. Your current browser may not support copying via this button. Search within book. Subscriber sign in You could not be signed in, please check and try again.
Username Please enter your Username. Password Please enter your Password. Forgot password? You could not be signed in, please check and try again. Sign in with your library card Please enter your library card number. Jonathan Cape Ltd. If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian. All rights reserved. There remain, however, some formal elements of ministerial control. A summary is set out below in Table 1.
In addition to these formal elements, there are a range of other less formal elements of control: first, the use of policy pronouncements to, and secondly, limiting the ability of authorities to spend money. This requirement on Chief Executives, to manage the resources under their control according to the policies of the Commonwealth, is a potentially significant limitation on devolution.
In complying with s 44 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act a Chief Executive or their delegate is obliged to identify the relevant policies and then apply those policies, making choices to suit the particular circumstances. In effect this raises the policy to the status of law by requiring compliance or a rationalisation for non-compliance. No Finance Minister has yet revoked drawing rights as a specific measure to control spending by a Chief Executive or their delegate.
However, the power to do so is a significant ministerially controlled limit on spending which, as a direct consequence, allows for control over Chief Executives and their Agencies and prescribed Agencies. The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act established a regulatory, accounting and accountability framework for all those Commonwealth bodies that had previously been covered by the Audit Act Cth pt XI predominantly statutory authorities and the plethora of other Commonwealth bodies having their own financial, reporting and auditing provisions.
The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act distinguishes between Commonwealth authorities [94] and Commonwealth companies. The essence of the distinction between Commonwealth authorities and Commonwealth companies is in the sources of their management framework obligations.
The overall effect of the introduction of the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act was to:. The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act management framework sets out high-level general management duties [] and audit and financial reporting requirements, [] and prescribes compliance with certain general policies of the government.
The regulatory, accounting and accountability framework established for Commonwealth authorities by the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act covers a number of matters. A Commonwealth authority must comply with General Policy Orders to the extent they apply to the authority.
A Commonwealth authority must prepare an annual report that includes financial statements that have been audited by the Auditor-General. Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act Commonwealth companies, consistent with their departure from ministerial control via board composition, voting power or number of shares , [] have a less formal regulatory, accounting and accountability framework.
The Corporations Act Cth provides the basic framework [] and there are various additional obligations for audit, [] reporting, [] audit committees, [] and compliance with General Policy Orders to the extent that they are applicable to the company. The element with the potential to be most significant is a General Policy Order made by the Finance Minister [] that applies to Commonwealth authorities [] and wholly owned Commonwealth companies, [] and to their subsidiaries.
Like the policies applying to Chief Executives of Agencies and prescribed Agencies under the Financial Management and Accountability Act , the General Policy Order has the potential to be a significant limitation on devolution and an important means of asserting ministerial control.
The Workplace Relations Act Cth established a process for agreement-making and detailed specific protection against unlawful termination and discrimination, among other things. That Act also imposed the same industrial relations and employment arrangements for public servants as those applying to other workers. The consequence of these arrangements is that employment authority and responsibility has been devolved to Agency Heads.
A summary is set out below in Table 3. In addition to these formal elements, there are a range of other less formal, but still significant, elements of ministerial control. Some of these are considered next. Notably, the ministerial controls asserted under the Financial Management and Accountability Act and Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act are generally of an overarching managerial nature, while those under the Public Service Act are generally more specifically directed to the performance of individual public servants.
The Public Service Act recognises, although it does not expressly state, that it is. The effect of the reforms has probably been to engender a high level of responsiveness to government in the APS, [] albeit there might have been some adverse consequences for public administration.
Despite the apparent changes following the move from the Workplace Relations Act Cth , which devolved employment decisions about setting remuneration and employment terms and conditions to the individual agencies through AWAs and certified agreements, to the Fair Work Act Cth , which sets out a process of agreement-making through enterprise bargaining and a safety net of minimum employment conditions, the need to measure performance remains unchanged.
The APS Values specifically address the relationships between the executive and the Parliament regarding the performance of employees working under the Public Service Act. The following are examples. Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the effectiveness of their portfolios, but for operational efficiency they must be able to delegate substantial powers to staff in APS agencies. APS staff are accountable for the way in which they administer government policies. This Value, which complements the apolitical service Value, will ensure that governments have a comprehensive view of issues and access to a full range of options on which to make decisions.
Despite these directions and the apparent apolitical imperative of the APS Values, the Australian Public Service Commission has also clearly stated that. This might suggest that these schemes removed accountability, authority and oversight of performance from the responsible Ministers. Despite this rhetoric, however, the analysis presented in this article demonstrates that Ministers do maintain significant controls, and that they have retained lines of responsibility and reporting such that they remain answerable to Parliament and ultimately the electorate for matters entrusted to them according to their portfolio allocation.
These reforms confirm that it is the Ministers who are the conduit between the Parliament and the executive and that the Ministers are, in practice, answerable to Parliament for both their own decisions and actions and those of the APS hierarchy that is in turn answerable to the Minister.
The real and practical advance of devolution in the public administration reforms in the Public Service Act , Financial Management and Accountability Act and Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act , however, has been to distinguish between the spheres of activities and responsibilities of Ministers and APS employees.
The analysis also reveals different levels of ministerial control: the Financial Management and Accountability Act and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act provide for more general controls by Ministers over the operations of Agencies, prescribed Agencies and bodies, while the Public Service Act provides for more specific controls over individual APS employees in the performance of their duties.
It also means that the various forms of parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial responsibility need to make some distinctions.
The environments are determined by the policies promulgated by the Ministers. Most importantly, however, the analysis in this article reveals a conception of ministerial responsibility within the constitutional compact of responsible government and, in doing so, demonstrates the application of that constitutional principle. See also Constitutional Commission, Final Report vol 1, 84—6 [2.
The requirements for debiting and crediting all cash transactions to a fund account in a central ledger will be removed. In future, transactions of Agencies will be processed and recorded in their own accounting systems. The amendments will therefore facilitate the move to devolved accounting and banking arrangements for Agencies, consistent with more business like approaches used in the private sector.
The Minister stated at The underlying purpose of the proposed Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act is to replace all of these diverse accountability requirements with a single set of core requirements. Some exceptions are outlined in Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act s 7 2 :. Notably, there are some additional disclosure and voting obligations for directors: ss 27F—27J. If a person contravenes a civil penalty provision, a court may make various declarations and impose a pecuniary penalty and compensation: sch 2 cls 2—4.
There is a defence to s 23 for an officer if the officer is required to do the act under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act s 27A 1 or in the course of the performance of duties as a public servant s 27A 2 , and in some circumstances for a director acting in good faith and after making proper inquiry if appropriate ss 27D—27E.
The defences to s 24 are the same as those for s see above n The defences to s 25 are the same as those for s see above n See also ss 8 , 12 4 excluded subsidiaries ; Auditor-General Act Cth s See also Auditor-General Act Cth s
0コメント